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Abstract:  An alleged achievement of socialism was gender equality in the 
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wages declined from 0.31 to 0.19 between 1986 and 1998 and that this is 
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suggesting extraordinary improvement of women’s relative situation. Further, 
we find that variation over time in the wage gaps is associated with public and 
large firms having progressively smaller gaps than their counterparts.  
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1. Introduction 
An alleged achievement of socialism was gender equality in the labour market. Has the collapse 
of socialism undermined this accomplishment? The possibility of a deterioration of the relative 
position of women is based on the argument that, after the collapse of central planning, managers 
can choose to reward economically irrelevant characteristics such as gender. This collapse 
eliminated the strict rules for setting wages and could thus be responsible for a resurgence of 
gender discrimination in the labour market. A different, and opposite, possibility would be that 
the relative situation of women could improve after the collapse of socialism. One reason is that 
market forces can punish discriminatory wage-setting behaviour and thus reduce the gender 
wage gap (Becker, 1957). Another reason would be that transition presumably rewards sectors in 
which women had advantages (for instance, services).  
  This paper investigates male-female differences in the labour market before and during the 
transition from central planning to market economy. The relative situation of women in the 
labour market and the role of discrimination as an underlying determinant are important issues 
and the attendant literature is large.
1 This paper, we argue, extends the existing literature in 
several ways. First, we claim that ours is the first paper to use objective data
2 for sufficiently 
large and representative samples
 of wage earners before, during and after
3 the introduction of 
massive economic reform.
 The data covers 2.9 million Hungarian wage earners from 1986 to 
1998. Second, the large sample sizes allows a correction for potential selection bias in our 
estimates that is, also, unique in the literature. Third, we provide estimates of standard errors for 
the male-female difference in log wages and for the estimates of discrimination so that it is 
possible to test whether the change over time is statistically significant. Such estimates are 
seldom provided in the literature and, consequently, these essential tests are not carried out. Last 
but not least, our examination of Hungary sheds light on a country which heretofore has received 
relatively less attention than many other transition countries. A focus on Hungary is particularly 
                                                 
1 Boeri and Terrell (2002), Brainerd (2000), Flanagan (1998) and Svejnar (1999) provide reviews of the 
literature on labour markets (including gender issues) in transition economies. Altonji and Blank (1999) 
list the study of changes in gender wage differentials as a crucial direction for future research. 
2 By “objective data” we simply mean “not retrospective data,” that is, data that do not suffer potential 
recall bias. 
3 Despite its volume, this literature has few studies that present estimates for the communist and transition 
periods.
 Data availability is clearly the binding constraint. Data collected before 1989 (that is, under 
communism) exist in large quantities, yet most has to be re-coded. Ours is unique in that primary data 
were carefully re-coded to (current) standard international classifications.   3
useful because it is in many ways representative of the Central European transition economies. 
The size of the Hungarian population is between that of Poland and Estonia, and almost identical 
to that of the Czech Republic. It also has a per capita GDP higher than those of Poland and 
Estonia, but lower than the Czech and Slovenian figures.
4 
  How did market liberalisation take root and how did it affect wage-setting behaviour? In 
many respects, Hungary is also representative of labour market developments in Central Europe 
as it can be seen as far from the Estonian aggressive laissez-faire and equally far from the more 
guarded Slovenian approach.
5 Although Hungary was the only Visegrad country to start the 
transition with a working legal framework in place to cope with unemployment (Boeri and 
Pulay, 1998), it does not differ from others in that the disappearance of the strict central planning 
wage setting system was swift (Kollo, 2002). The government's attempts at setting-up collective 
bargaining frameworks were met with limited success: “The new Hungarian system of wage 
setting is based on the principle of bargaining freedom, but actual wage evolution is far more 
dependent on employers’ decisions and the immediate impact of market forces than on collective 
agreements with low coverage and poor contents” (Koltay, 2002, p. 61).  
  This paper investigates male-female differences in the labour market before and during the 
transition from central planning to market economy in Hungary from 1986 to 1998. The main 
results from our analysis are the following. First, the relative situation of women improved 
dramatically: the female to male wage ratio (in levels) increased from 73 percent in 1986 to 80 
percent in 1998. Our estimates show that the male-female difference in log wages declined 
drastically from 0.31 to 0.19 during this period. Second, the role of “discrimination” also 
declined markedly: using standard Oaxaca decomposition, we find that between 1986 and 1998 
the component of the log wage differential that can not be explained by the model declined by 
0.11. Notice that from 1986 to 1998, the male-female difference in log wages declined by an 
amount of 0.12 and almost this entire decline can be explained by the drop in the unexplained or 
                                                 
4 Among the former socialist economies, Hungary was a forerunner to join the European Union. A 
requirement for joining is the adoption of a legal and institutional framework (the acquis communitaire). 
One aspect of the acquis is “Social Policy and Employment” which demands equal treatment for women 
and men in the labour market. This is an area where Hungary is viewed as “…already well advanced 
regarding both transposition, implementation and enforcement” (Commission of the European 
Communities, p. 61, 2001). 
5 For comprehensive analyses of labour market reform in Hungary, see Fazekas and Koltay (2002) and 
Hovarth et al. (1999). For an examination of wage determinants during reform, see Campos and Jolliffe 
(2002).   4
“discrimination” component of the Oaxaca decomposition. Third, by examining gender wage 
differentials by firm size and firm ownership we are able to throw light on a number of 
previously unexplored issues. For instance, we find that over time public firms and large firms 
show progressively smaller gender wage gaps than their counterparts.  
  The paper is organised as follows. The next section reviews the literature, section 3 discusses 
data, the estimation strategy and our method for sample selection correction, section 4 has our 
main results and section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The Empirical Evidence 
The econometric evidence on the relative situation of women in the labour market and the role of 
discrimination as an underlying determinant is voluminous.
  Yet the vast majority of this 
literature examines wage gaps at a fixed point in time,
6 or the few studies examining the change 
over two points in time do so typically for years close together and/or solely during the transition 
period. Further, the results from the literature are mixed as to whether transition has resulted in 
an improvement or deterioration of women's wages relative to average male wages.
  
Orazem and Vodopivec (1995) show that during the early years of transition in Slovenia, the 
large decline in real wages coincided with the relative improvement of women’s wages. The 
male-female difference in log wages was 0.13 in 1987 and this declined to 0.10 in 1991.
7 They 
further show that the relative improvement for women was largely due to greater demand for 
better-educated labourers and also because women worked disproportionately in sectors that 
benefited from transition. Within sectors, though, women lost relative to men.  
In contrast, a study from China indicates that women's wages have deteriorated relative to 
men's wages during the transition. Liu, Meng and Zhang (2000) examine the change in the male-
female wage differential in China during economic reform. Using data from Shanghai and Jinan, 
they find that economic reform leads to increases in the male-female difference in the log wage 
but a decrease in the relative importance of discrimination in explaining the log wage difference. 
The primary explanation for their results is that privatisation increases the returns to education 
                                                 
6 For examples of research on gender wage gaps at one point in time for Central and Eastern and 
European countries, see Paternostro and Sahn (1999), Pailhé (2000), Jurajda (2001), Jolliffe (2002) and 
Ogloblin (1999).   
7 Orazem and Vodopivec do not provide estimates of standard errors so it is not possible to determine if 
this decline is statistically significant.    5
and experience, and males in Shanghai and Jinan are better endowed with these characteristics. It 
is noteworthy that also in this respect, China differs from many CEE countries in that in the latter 
men and women have had fairly equal levels of schooling and experience.  
  In a comprehensive study, Brainerd (2000) examines the change in male-female wage 
differences during transition in nine Central and Eastern European and three Former Soviet 
Union countries. Brainerd's main result suggest a pattern of declining male-female wage 
differences in post-transition Eastern Europe but of increasing gaps in the male-female wage 
difference in the Former Soviet Union countries. In particular, she shows that the male-female 
difference in log wages increased 0.27 in the Ukraine and 0.15 in Russia, both indicative of a 
severe deterioration of relative wages for women.
8 Using qualitative data, Linz (1996) finds 
support for the hypothesis that transition to a market economy led to the relative decline of the 
welfare of women in the Russian labour market.  
  Reilly’s results (1999) on Russia contrast to the above as he finds no change in the Russian 
male-female wage gap during the transition. His estimate of the male-female difference in hourly 
log wages in 1992 is 0.25 and in 1996 this estimate is 0.24. As with all of the studies discussed 
here, there are no estimates of standard errors so it is not possible to determine if this change is 
statistically significant. Whether the decline is statistically significant or not, it is qualitatively 
fairly small.  
All seven CEE countries Brainerd examined showed improvement of women's wages relative 
to male wages. The difference between the pre-transition and transition log wage differentials 
range from –0.03 in Slovenia to –0.14 in Estonia, with estimates from Hungary, the Czech and 
Slovak Republics, Poland, and Eastern Germany falling in between.
9 In contrast to Brainerd, 
Jones and Ilayperuma (1994) show that for Bulgaria, female wages declined relative to male 
wages between 1989 and 1992. 
Newell and Reilly (2001) examine gender wage gaps in eleven transition economies (six 
                                                 
8 The reported changes in gender gap (log wages) are -0.096 for Hungary, -0.124 for Poland, 
-0.063 for the Czech Republic, -0.092 for Slovakia, and -0.030 for Slovenia. Standard errors are also not 
reported in this study, so it is not possible to determine if the relatively small samples affect the 
interpretation of the estimated changes. For instance, the post-transition results from Hungary are based 
on responses from 922 men and 805 women. 
9 More precisely the reported measures are 
} } Post Pre {ln(w ) ln(w ) { ln(w ) ln(w ) mm ff −− −
, where ln(w) 
is log wages, the bar denotes average, the m and f subscripts are for male and female, the superscripts 
mark whether the measures are from pre- or post-transition.    6
Central European and five former Soviet Union countries). Their two main findings are that there 
seem to be little difference in terms of wage gaps between these two groups of countries and, 
second, there seem to be very little evidence that those gaps have increased during the transition.  
In conclusion,  there are two sound yet opposite hypothesis on the effect of economic reforms 
on the relative situation of women in the labour market. One would imagine that the empirical 
literature would be helpful in evaluating their comparative merits. Yet, as shown above, this is 
not the case: the evidence is still very much mixed. Some studies report increases in the wage 
gaps during the transition, others report decline. We believe that data-related difficulties are 
partly to blame for this inconclusiveness.
10 In what follows, we present results based on data 
from a consistent questionnaire kept over long periods of time for a representative and 
sufficiently large sample of wage earners.  
 
3. Data and Empirical Specification 
The data used in our analysis come from the Wage and Earnings Survey (WES) of the National 
Employment Office in Hungary, and contains information on wages, education, type of 
employment, and other demographic data. We use data from the five years of 1986, 1989, 1992, 
1995, and 1998 to cover the pre-reform and transition period. The universe was obtained from a 
firm census administered by the Hungarian Central Statistical Office. The sample is nationally 
representative of all sectors and industrial activities.  The sample sizes range from a low of 
136,829 in 1992 to a high of 933,282 wage earners in 1989. The sample sizes for the three other 
years are all above 450,000 observations resulting in a pool of more than 2.9 million wage 
earners. 
3.1 Sample Design 
For all five years the sampling units are wage earners and these are selected following a 
systematic, random selection procedure. The details of the procedures varied across the years in 
                                                 
10 In particular, we believe that issues of data quality and sample representativeness are important factors 
in explaining the lack of consensus. Supporting our belief that a lack of sufficiently representative sample 
data is a determinant of the conflicting empirical results, Munich, Svejnar and Terrell argue that 
“Depending on the number of individuals that one's sample contains from different age categories, one's 
estimates may reflect the concave or flatter parts of the wage-experience profile. This may account for 
some of the differences among the estimates obtained ...” (2002, p. 25). Filer and Hanousek also lend 
support to this view by noting that “The bottom line is that it is even more important than usual in dealing   7
ways that affect the sample weights, but across all years the design is random and the estimates 
are representative of the sample frame. The sample frame for the years 1986, 1989, and 1992 
includes all wage earners in private and public firms with more than 20 employees. The frame 
was supplemented in the 1995 and 1998 to also include smaller firms with more than 10 
employees.
11   
In addition to this change in the sample frame, the procedure for sample selection changed on 
three occasions. In 1986 and 1989 wage earners were selected following a systematic, random 
design with a fixed interval of selection. From the list of all manual wage earners in each firm, 
one observation was randomly drawn and then every seventh employee thereafter was drawn. 
The same random selection procedure was used for all non-manual wage earners, except that the 
interval of selection was set to every fifth employee.
12 For the years 1992, 1995, and 1998, the 
selection procedure changed from a fixed-interval selection procedure to a systematic selection 
procedure based on date of birth. In the case of manual labourers, all workers born on the 5
th or 
15
th day of each month were selected; and in the case of nonmanual labourers, all were selected 
who were born on the 5
th, 15
th, or 25
th day of each month.
13 Rather than a random starting point 
and fixed interval of selection, this design is based on the fact that date of birth is randomly and 
approximately uniformly distributed across days of the month. 
With the exception of the supplementation to the sample frame in 1995 and 1998, the sample 
design is a stratified, single-stage, systematic random draw that results in estimates which are 
representative of the sample frame population. The relevant issue is that the comparison across 
time suffers the slight problem that the frame changed for the last two years, 1995 and 1998. For 
the years 1986, 1989, and 1992, estimates are representative of all wage labourers who work in 
firms that have at least 20 employees. For the years 1995 and 1998, the estimates are 
representative of all wage labourers who work in firms that have at least 10 employees. If it were 
                                                                                                                                                               
with data from transition countries to pay careful attention to the details of how the data were collected 
and the exact wording of questions and sample design (2002, pp.237-8).” 
11 This supplementation was achieved following a two-stage selection process. In the first stage, 20 
percent of the additional firms (10 to 20 employees) were selected and then in the second stage all wage 
earners in these firms were selected into the sample. 
12 Kish (1965) notes that systematic sampling is “perhaps the most widely known selection procedure” (p. 
113) and suggests its simplicity reduces the potential for introducing error in the selection procedure.  
13 This change in the design reduced the sample size starting in 1992. Survey non-response in 1992 also 
led to a decline in sample size. Table 2 lists the number of sample observations and the weighted sample 
size for each year.   8
the case that firms with 10 to 20 employees reward education in a way that is systematically 
different from firms with 20 or more employees, then it is possible that observed changes in 
returns to education over time result in part from changing the sample frame in 1995. 
One way to correct for this change in the sample frame is to exclude from our analysis those 
firms with 10 to 20 employees in years 1995 and 1998. Unfortunately the variable which 
identifies firm size, only indicates three types of firms: small firms with less than 50 employees, 
large firms with more than 300 employees, and mid-sized firms with 50 to 300 employees.
14  The 
strategy we follow in this paper is to report our results by these three types of firm size, and then 
for the entire sample. For the mid-size and large firms, the sample frame remains unchanged 
over the years. For the firms with less than 50 employees, the analysis suffers a potential bias 
resulting from the changing sample frame, and interpretations about change over time for the 
small firms needs to be interpreted with this caveat in mind. Analysis for the full sample also 
suffers this potential bias, but it is likely mitigated by the presence of the mid-sized and large 
firms.  
3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
The monthly value of wages used in our analysis is the sum of the official base wage received 
and other payments that the employee receives monthly (rewards given in the reference month, 
provisions, overtime work, shift work, other special payments, e.g. in mining). In addition, the 
value of wages includes a pro-rated estimate of irregular payments (1/12 of irregular payments in 
the previous year).
15  
To assess the data quality, we show in Table 1 that the WES wage data match reasonably 
well with other available data sources. In particular, we compare average wages and the female-
male wage ratio from the WES with data from the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (CSO) 
and from Fazekas and Koltay (2002). The WES data used in this paper are based on all industrial 
sectors and provide estimates of gross wages.
 The first set of CSO estimates, available from 1986 
to 1992, are from a subset of industries and in 1986 are for net earnings.
16 The second set of CSO 
estimates and the Fazekas and Koltay estimates are gross wage estimates based on all sectors. 
                                                 
14 To put it differently, we are unable to identify those firms with fewer than 20 employees separately 
from those firms with fewer than 50 employees.  
15 It should be noted that our sample is restricted to full-time workers. In the WES data set, unfortunately, 
there is no information on the total number of hours worked. It must be said, however, that we are 
unaware of any existing results covering both pre and post transition using  information on hours worked.   9
WES average wages are slightly higher than all of the other estimates. The worst match is in 
1986 where the CSO average wage estimate is approximately 7 percent less than the WES 
estimate. We assume that part of the difference in the estimates is because the CSO estimate is 
based on a subset of industries and note that when the WES is compared with the other data 
sources, the differences are much smaller. In terms of the female-male wage ratio, the WES 
estimates are within a percentage point of the other sources for all years except 1998. For this 
most recent year, the WES estimate is close to the CSO estimate but differs substantially from 
Fazekas and Koltay.
17  
Table 1: Comparison of Wage Estimates from WES and Other Data Sources 
       
1986 1989 1992 1995 1998
Monthly Gross Earnings (Forint)    
Wage and Employment Survey (WES)
 1 6,716 10,756 22,465  40,190  69,415
Central Statistical Office-Census
 2 6,260 10,461 22,133   
Central Statistical Office-Survey
 3 22,294  39,854  68,718
Fazekas and Koltay
 4 10,571 22,294  38,900  67,764
Female-Male Wage Ratio    
Wage and Employment Survey (WES)  73% 74% 82%  81%  80%
Central Statistical Office-Survey  81%  80%  79%
Fazekas and Koltay  74% 75% 83%  81%  85%
1 Wage and Employment Survey (WES), National Labor Center, Hungary. All industrial sectors. 
2 Central Statistical Office, Labor-related Establishment Census. Data provided by International 
Labour Organization, available at: http://laborsta.ilo.org. Estimates are restricted to industry 
codes 2-9 of ISIC, revision 2 (not directly comparable to WES estimates). 1986 estimates are net 
earnings.  
3 Central Statistical Office, Labor-related Establishment Survey. Data provided by International 
Labour Organization, available at: http://laborsta.ilo.org. All industries included and estimates 
are gross earnings.  
4 Fazekas and Koltay (2002). Gross earnings are from Table 7.1, and wage ratio is from Table 
3.1.  
 
                                                                                                                                                               
16 Estimates are restricted to ISIC (revision 2) industry codes 2-9. 
17 It should be noted that although the total number of observations vary from year to year, the variation in 
weighted number of observations mimics Hungarian labour force developments over time. As noted, the 
sample starts including smaller firms only after 1995, which is six years after the demise of central 
planning when a buoyant private sector has already started taking root. Although we are able to insulate 
our results from these changes, it would be valuable for future research to look into the behaviour of the 
private sector in more detail, in particular, during the early transition years (1989 to 1992) when major 
changes actually took place.    10
The measure of schooling is a vector of six dummy variables that denote the highest type of 
completed schooling. The school types include primary, three types of secondary (vocational, 
technical, and gymnasium or general), college, and university.
18 In 1998, 22 percent of wage 
earners had only primary schooling or less, while 19 percent had college or university education. 
Of the remaining 59 percent who completed some form of secondary schooling, slightly less than 
half attended vocational school (28 percent of the total). 
Table 2 lists means and standard errors for several of the relevant variables by gender. To 
allow for ease of comparison, school attainment is presented as total years of schooling where 
degrees have been assigned specific years.
19 It is immediately apparent that not only is there a 
large difference in the mean level of wages, but also that the male-female wage gap appears to be 
declining during transition. In 1986, the ratio of mean female to male wages was 73 percent, and 
by 1998 this ratio increased to 80 percent. A difference in average wages is certainly no 
indication of discrimination since it could simply be due to different economic attributes of men 
and women wage earners. The data on years of schooling and experience, though, appear to 
provide little explanation for the wage gap. While average levels of schooling are slightly lower 
for women in 1986 and 1992, female wage earners have higher levels of education in 1989, 1995 
and 1998.
20 In contrast, there is a consistent gap in years of experience with male wage earners 








                                                 
18 The omitted category is those individuals with less than primary schooling. 
19 For details on how the different types of schooling are mapped into years of school attainment, see 
Campos and Žlábková (2001). 
20 While all the differences are statistically significant due to the small standard errors, the largest gap in 
mean school attainment is 0.3 years in 1998.   11
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics by Sex, 1986-1998 
 
  1986 1989 1992 1995 1998        
Full Sample   
Wages (Forint/month), Male  7,604 12,181 24,639 44,438  77,283
 (5.39) (13.56) (62.46) (127.12)  (265.08)
Wages (Forint/month), Female  5,544 9,035 20,088 35,879  61,607
 (3.967) (9.349) (48.910) (84.557)  (185.210)
Years of Schooling, Male  9.8 10.0 11.3 11.1  11.1
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.011) (0.010)  (0.009)
Years of Schooling, Female  9.6 10.3 11.2 11.3  11.4
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.011) (0.008)  (0.008)
Potential Experience, Male  22.7 22.6 21.8 22.3  22.2
 (0.022) (0.027) (0.044) (0.040)  (0.042)
Potential Experience, Female  22.2 22.1 21.5 21.7  21.9
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.041) (0.033)  (0.033)
Proportion Male  0.57 0.55 0.52 0.50  0.50
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)
Number of Observations  831,407 933,282 136,829 529,928 487,160
Weighted Number of Obs.  3,342,962 3,092,818 2,858,445 2,211,040  1,984,667
 
Notes: Wage and Earnings Survey (WES) of the National Labor Center in Hungary. Standard errors are in 
parentheses.  
 
An examination of the ratio of mean female to male wages by firm size reveals that the most 
change occurred in large firms: in 1986, the mean female wage was equal to 68 percent of the 
mean male wage, which was the lowest ratio across the three firm sizes. By 1998 this ratio 
increased to 93 percent, which was the highest ratio across the firm sizes. In contrast, the pattern 
for experience by firm size is fairly similar, with men having slightly more experience on 
average than women in firms of all sizes. One notable exception is in 1986, when men working 
in large firms had an average of three years more experience than their female counterparts. 
Similarly, men had higher mean levels of schooling in 1986 across all firm sizes, but in 1995 and 
1998 women working in medium- and large-sized firms had significantly more schooling. 
3.3 The Wage Equation 




i1 i 2 i 3 i i ln(w ) S E E =β+ β + β + + ε 4i X β  (1) 
   12
where the i subscript denotes the individual, w is wages, S indicates the highest level of 
schooling attained, E is potential experience, and X contains a set of variables to control for 
institutional and demographic characteristics as well as spatial price differences. More 
specifically, X includes a set of eight dummy variables to control for potential differences across 
industries.
21 The set of controls also includes dummy variables for the size of the firm, and X 
also contains a dummy for each of the 19 counties of Hungary and for the capital, Budapest. 
These spatial-specific, binary variables control for any variation that is specific to Budapest or 
some particular county. In particular, these dummy variables control for spatial variation in 
prices, which are likely to be significant with wages and prices in Budapest higher than other 
regions. The county dummy variables also control for region specific differences in labour 
markets, which might affect wages. For example, unemployment rates are relatively lower in 
Budapest, the counties along the Budapest–Vienna highway, and the counties along the 
Hungarian–Austrian border. Similarly, the county dummies will control for the potential 
measurement issue that a year of schooling may result in different levels of human capital 
accumulation over different regions if there are differences in schooling quality across regions. 
The controls for firm size, industry and county fixed effects, greatly reduce the potential for 
omitted variable bias in our estimation of equation (1).
22 Having data that has been collected 
using the same survey instrument over the years of 1986 to 1998 also significantly improves the 
credibility of measured changes. Frequently, comparisons over time come from different data 
sources and one is left with the question of whether the change over time observed by the data 
analyst results from actual changes in the population, or is simply the result of changing the 
survey instrument. These are important advantages to using the WES data. 
  The disadvantage of using the WES data is that the choice of variables is small and our 
ability to empirically address violations of the OLS parametric assumptions is limited 
accordingly. One well-known violation of the classical assumptions occurs if education is 
correlated with the regression residual. One candidate cause of correlation is that there is some 
                                                 
21 The eight classifications are: industry, construction, transportation and telecommunications, trade, 
water, services, health and social services, and public services. The excluded classification is agriculture. 
22 Though, we should note, these controls also do introduce the potential for endogeneity bias. For 
example, if highly educated people move to high-wage counties to earn better wages, then the estimated 
return to education is biased. While we believe there is little evidence of labour mobility sufficiently large 
to create this sort of bias, we did estimate the model with industry and county controls omitted as an 
alternate specification and found qualitatively similar results.     13
omitted variable, such as innate ability, that is both correlated with education and with wages. 
Failing to include ability in the regression results in correlation between education and the 
residuals and biased point estimates. One way to correct this type of bias is to use instrumental 
variables to purge education of that component which is correlated with the residuals. This 
approach though, requires that there is some variable that is both correlated with schooling but 
also reasonably excluded from the wage equation. We argue that there is no such variable in the 
WES data that allows us to credibly instrument education, and we caution that one should keep 
this potential bias in mind when interpreting the results. A mitigating factor is that our analysis 
focuses on how returns have changed over the communist and transition years. If the magnitude 
of these potential biases has not changed over time, then their impact on drawing inferences 
about change over time is limited. 
  Another potential cause of correlation between education and the regression residual can 
occur if people select in and out of the sample based on some characteristic that is correlated 
with the return to schooling.
23 For example, if persons with high returns are more likely to be 
wage earners and those with expected low returns opt out of the sample, then this induces 
correlation and results in sample-selection bias. This source of bias is typically corrected by 
explicitly modelling the selection decision, but this requires that there exists at least one variable 
that explains the decision to work in the wage sector but does not explain the wage level.
24 
Again, we believe that no such variable exists in the WES data, but we argue that the unique 
features of the labour market in 1986 will help us to control for sample-selection bias.  
  A fundamental characteristic of the centrally-planned economies was that workers had very 
limited ability to select in or out of the wage market. All persons of working age were required to 
work, official unemployment was close to zero, and the opportunity to choose to work in non-
wage employment was highly limited. An implication of this lack of freedom to select out of the 
wage market means that the pre-transition, 1986 WES estimates of the wage equation (1) will not 
suffer from sample-selection bias.
25 
                                                 
23 For East Germany from 1990 to 1994, Hunt (2002) finds that the 10 point improvement in the gender 
wage gap is a result of the reduction of participation of low wage women in the labour market. 
24 Just to make this point clear: this data set does not contain observations for those individuals not in the 
wage market. The standard Heckman correction can therefore not be made because it is not possible to 
estimate a participation equation.  
25 Munich, Svejnar and Terrell (2002) note that “In addition to regulating wages, the central planners 
regulated employment and admissions to higher education. With minor exceptions, all able-bodied adults   14
  Access to the 1986, pre-transition data is a unique feature of our analysis that allows us to 
control for selection bias in the later, post-1989 years. Our principal assumption is that the 
decision to participate in the wage market is correlated with age, sex and schooling 
demographics.
26 The change that is empirically observed in these characteristics in the post-1989 
WES data comes from either people selecting in and out of the wage market or true population 
changes. If we assume that any change of these characteristics in the sample after 1989 is due to 
people choosing to leave and enter the wage market, then we can control for selection bias by re-
weighting the WES data to have the same demographic composition as the 1986 data.
27  
  More specifically, we partition each of the WES samples into six age categories (under 30, 
30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50 and over), the seven school types described above and sex; for a 
total of 84 age-sex-education categories. We then define the proportion of the population that 
belongs to each of these categories in year t as:  
 
  
kk jj K tt t
ki , k i , k ii k / ν≡ ω ω ∑ ∑∑  (2) 
      
where the k subscripts runs from 1 to K and represents the 84 age-sex-education categories, i 
subscripts the individual observation and runs from 1 to jk for each of the k categories, and ωi,k 
represents the weight or expansion factor for individual i in category k. To re-weight the data 
such that the demographic composition in later years matches the composition from 1986, we 
construct new weights for each year: 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
were obliged to work. Jobs were provided for everyone and employment security was assured” (2002, p. 
6). Further, Horvath et al. (1999) argue that the registered unemployment rate in Hungary increased 
rapidly with the launching of reforms reaching 1.4% in 1990. 
26 Svejnar (1999) and Boeri and Terrell (2002) observe that early retirement schemes, youth 
unemployment and the reduction of female labour force participation rates are stylised facts of the 
transition. 
27 This methodology is conceptually similar to that proposed by DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996). 
They propose a semi-parametric methodology to answer questions such as “what would the density of 
wages have been in 1988 if worker’s attributes, such as their union status, had remained at their 1979 
level? One methodological contribution of this paper is to show that the estimation of such counterfactual 
densities can be greatly simplified by the judicious choice of a reweighting function” (1996, p. 1009). In 
this paper, we generate a baseline density by treating our 1986 sample as one in which sample-selection 
bias is negligible and re-weighting all the other four samples according to the demographic distribution of 
the 1986 sample, in terms of age-gender-education.   15
  
t8 6 t t
i,k k k i,k (/ ) k K ϖ= ν ν ω ∀ ∈ (3) 
  
 The  ν
86 term in the numerator adjusts the weights to reflect the demographic
 composition in 
1986, and the ν
t in the denominator normalises the adjustment to ensure that the sum of 
unadjusted weights equals the sum of adjusted weights. For example if low-educated, young 
males comprise a larger proportion of the sample in 1986 than in 1995, we adjust upwards the 
1995 weights to ensure that they represent the same proportions across both years. One difficulty 
with this approach is that it doesn't allow for any true population changes in the age, sex and 
education composition of the sample. Since there has been change in the population 
characteristics of these variables, this assumption does bias the estimates, but our assumption is 
that this bias is smaller in magnitude than the sample-selection bias.
28 While reweighting the data 
to match the 1986 demographic characteristics of the sample affects the interpretation of the 
results, it is in some ways a desirable characteristic. Changes in returns to say education can 
result from changes in the composition of the labour market and from how the labour market 
rewards education, conditional on the characteristics of the labour market. By re-weighting the 
data to the 1986 demographic composition, we purge from our analysis changes in labour supply 
and focus on market changes in the demand for wage labour. This focus allows us to examine 
whether firms are responding to liberalisation by providing greater returns to investment in 
human capital.  
 
4. Results  
4.1 Wage Regressions 
In this section we first discuss our results from estimating male and female wage regressions, as 
specified in equation (1), and then we study the Oaxaca decomposition. Panel A of Table 3 
presents the industry and county fixed-effects estimates of equation (1) for males, and Panel B 
                                                                                                                                                               
  
28 The Hungarian Central Statistical Office reports that the Hungarian population declined by about 2 
percent between 1990 and 1998, but the population proportion of men and women has remained constant. 
The changes have been much more significant for the population of wage earners. Fazekas and Koltay 
(2002, Table 3.1) note that registered unemployment increased more than tenfold from 47,700 in 1990 to 
507,700 in 1995. Similarly, the WES data indicate that there has been a significant change in the gender   16
lists these estimates for female wage earners. The standard errors listed in this table are corrected 
for heteroskedasticity of unknown form through use of the 'sandwich variance estimator' (Huber, 
1967; White, 1980). While the estimates for the male and female wage equations differ, there are 




















                                                                                                                                                               
composition of the labour force with the proportion of male wage earners dropping from 57 percent in 
1986 to 50 percent in 1998.      17
Table 3: Returns to School by Sex, 1986-1998 
Fixed-effects Estimates of Wage Equation (1) 
Dependent Variable: Log of Wages 
Full Sample by Sex                    1986  1989
 
       1992 
 
     1995 
 
  1998 
       
Panel A: Male Wage Earners   
Primary Schooling     0.104 0.020 0.109 0.095  0.160  
 (0.0023) (0.0038) (0.0095) (0.0128)  (0.0186)
Vocational (Secondary School) 0.190 0.088 0.228 0.208  0.307   
 (0.0023) (0.0039) (0.0120) (0.0129)  (0.0189)
Technical (Secondary School) 0.317 0.400 0.247 0.461  0.590   
 (0.0026) (0.0051) (0.0098) (0.0134)  (0.0192)
General (Secondary School)  0.238 0.201 0.458 0.422 0.525   
 (0.0033) (0.0047) (0.0102) (0.0148)  (0.0201)
College   0.516 0.424 0.786 0.822  1.015  
 (0.0034) (0.0053) (0.0118) (0.0145)  (0.0199)
University 0.690 0.718 0.992 1.042  1.277   
 (0.0034) (0.0057) (0.0119) (0.0147)  (0.0199)
Potential Experience  0.034 0.020 0.031 0.028  0.023  
 (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0009) (0.0008)  (0.0011)
Potential Experience Squared  -0.051 -0.030 -0.047 -3.835 -0.029   
 (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0020) (0.1794)  (0.0026)
Number of Observations: 434,224 387,278 67,440 161,106  148,966
R-squared: 0.31 0.23 0.37 0.36  0.40
Panel B: Female Wage Earners   
Primary Schooling     0.079 -0.012 0.117 0.047  0.175  
 (0.0024) (0.0040) (0.0083) (0.0125)  (0.0169)
Vocational (Secondary School) 0.207 0.061 0.307 0.168  0.301   
 (0.0029) (0.0046) (0.0111) (0.0131)  (0.0177)
Technical (Secondary School) 0.359 0.310 0.253 0.470  0.628   
 (0.0028) (0.0045) (0.0094) (0.0130)  (0.0173)
General (Secondary School)  0.290 0.220 0.476 0.425 0.597   
 (0.0029) (0.0046) (0.0088) (0.0132)  (0.0176)
College   0.583 0.412 0.770 0.795  0.911  
 (0.0042) (0.0049) (0.0093) (0.0129)  (0.0172)
University 0.786 0.747 1.005 1.065  1.236   
 (0.0037) (0.0057) (0.0113) (0.0142)  (0.0187)
Potential Experience  0.026 0.017 0.022 0.024  0.019  
 (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0009)  (0.0011)
Potential Experience Squared  -0.035 -0.031 -0.029 -0.033 -0.022   
 (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0015) (0.0022)  (0.0027)
Number of Observations: 397,183 546,004 69,389 368,822  338,194
R-squared: 0.35 0.27 0.37 0.37  0.38  
Notes: Dependent variable is the log of monthly wages in Forint. Estimates are corrected for sample 
selection bias. Standard errors, in parentheses, are robust to heteroscedasticity of unknown form. The 
remaining results from estimation of equation (1) are suppressed for the sake of brevity. The firm-size and 
industry dummies are jointly significant as well as the county, fixed effects. 
                                                                                                                                                               
29 A slight pattern that can be noticed is that the returns to schooling appear to be modestly higher for 
women. In particular, over all five years examined, the return to the female graduates of secondary 
vocational school and secondary general school are higher than for their male counterparts.    18
4.2 Oaxaca Decompositions 
Using the separate regression estimates for the male and female wage functions, Oaxaca 
(1973) proposed a method to decompose the observed gender wage gap into two components: (1) 
that which results from differences in education and experience levels (and any other explanatory 
variable) of men and women; and (2) that which can not be explained from the model and is 
often interpreted as resulting from labour-market discrimination. 
The Oaxaca decompositions rests on the fact that the OLS regression line runs through the 




mf m f m m f f ˆˆ l n ( w) l n ( w) ( X X) [ ( ) X ( ) X] − = − β + β −β + β −β  (4) 
 
where β 
* is the hypothetical wage structure that would exist in the absence of discrimination. 
The first term on the right-hand side of equation (4) represents the portion of the wage difference 
that is explained by differences in endowments across men and women. The second term on the 
right-hand side, in square brackets, represents the portion of the wage difference that is due to the 
different wage structures for men and women. This is the part of the wage differential that can 
not be explained by the model and is potentially due to discrimination.  
Interpreting the model residual as discrimination needs to be done with caution. If there is 
any sort of omitted variable that has a positive effect on wages, and if men are more highly 
endowed with this characteristic, then the results from the decomposition would overestimate 
discrimination. Alternatively, if some of the factors that are in the model are themselves affected 
by discrimination, then the analysis could well underestimate discrimination. For example, if 
women are more likely to be fired in economic downturns, or if they have less access to the types 
of schooling deemed more valuable by the market, then the decomposition may well 
underestimate discrimination.
30 
The selection of β 
*, the hypothetical non-discriminatory wage structure, poses a known 
index number problem that has been extensively discussed in the literature.
31 We follow 
Neumark (1988) who shows that the non-discriminatory wage structure can be given by the OLS 
                                                 
30 In terms of examining the welfare of women workers during the transition period, the Oaxaca analysis 
does not capture the many other activities that women frequently are required to undertake, such as 
childcare and housework. For a full discussion of the impact of transition on females, see Grapard (1997).    19
estimate from the pooled sample of male and female wage earners. One way to approach the 
problem of different candidate estimates of the non-discriminatory wage structure is to use 
several different estimates of β
* to verify the robustness of results. In our case, though, we are 
examining the level of discrimination at five different points in time and believe that it is helpful 
to choose one estimate of β
* in order to more easily interpret the results.
 32 
Panel A of Table 4 provides Oaxaca decompositions of the log wage gap for the five years of 
1986, 1989, 1992, 1995, and 1998 using the pooled-sample, OLS estimate as the non-
discriminatory wage structure. We refer to this panel as our preferred estimates because they are 
corrected for sample-selection bias and control for firm size, industry and county.
33 The first 
column of this panel shows that the male-female difference in log wages has declined by 39 
percent from 0.31 in 1986 to 0.19, and the second column provides standard errors which 
indicate that the difference is highly significant.
34 How do our results compare? Our estimate of 
the male-female difference in log wages for 1992 is 0.21, which is fairly close to the estimate of 






                                                                                                                                                               
31 See Oaxaca (1973), Reimers (1983), Cotton (1988), Neumark (1988), and Appleton et al. (1999).  
32 We did also use βf and βm as estimates of β
*, and found that the qualitative nature of the changing 
pattern of discrimination over time was similar to the results from using the pooled estimate of β. One of 
our primary results is that the male-female log wage difference declined by 0.12 and the large majority of 
this decline is due to a similar drop in the discrimination component of the Oaxaca decomposition. When 
β
* is proxied by the pooled estimate of β, the discrimination component declines by 0.11 between 1986 
and 1998. When proxied by βf  the decline is 0.12 and using βm results in a decline of 0.14 in the 
discrimination component of the decomposition. 
33 Panel B of Table 4 provides estimates without the correction for sample selection. By 1998, the 
uncorrected log wage gap is slightly greater than the corrected gap indicating that a small amount of the 
observed differences in wages is due to selection. The results also indicate that the decline in the 
'discrimination' component between 1986 and 1998 is slightly dampened by the correction for sample 
selection.    
34 Given the large samples sizes it is not that surprising that this decline in the log wage gap is highly, 
statistically significant with a p-value of 1.3e-47.   20
Table 4: Oaxaca Decomposition of Gender Wage Gap 
Full Sample Comparisons, 1986-1998 
 




Part of Gap Explained by the Model




Error           
Panel A: Corrected for sample selection bias 
Preferred model, controlling for industry and county
    
1986  0.31 (0.0009) 0.09    0.03  0.01  0.21 (0.0007) 
1989  0.30 (0.0012) 0.09    0.01  0.00  0.22 (0.0010) 
1992  0.21  (0.0027)  0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.18  (0.0022) 
1995  0.21 (0.0027) 0.10    0.02  0.01  0.11 (0.0024) 
1998  0.19  (0.0029)  0.09 -0.01 0.00 0.10  (0.0030) 
          
Panel B: Not corrected for sample selection bias     
1986  0.31 (0.0009) 0.09  0.03  0.01  0.21 (0.0007) 
1989  0.30 (0.0011) 0.09  0.02  0.00  0.22 (0.0009) 
1992  0.20  (0.0027)  0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.16  (0.0019) 
1995  0.19 (0.0024) 0.10  0.02  0.01  0.09 (0.0020) 
1998  0.18  (0.0023)  0.09 -0.01 0.00 0.08  (0.0021)                       
Notes: Standard errors are bootstrap estimates from 200 replications. The last column lists standard errors 
for the unexplained component of the model, or discrimination. 
 
The column labelled 'Part of the Gap Explained by the Model, Total' provides an estimate of 
the first term on the right hand side of equation (4). The estimates from Panel A of Table 4 
indicate that in 1986, the male-female log wage difference would have been 0.09 if males and 
females were paid according to the same wage structure. In other words, 29 percent of the actual 
log wage difference of 0.31 can be explained by factors in the model. This estimate fluctuated 
over the 13-year period, but the data indicate that by 1998 the male-female log wage difference 
would once again have been 0.09 if males and females were paid according to the same wage 
structure. A noteworthy difference, though, is that in 1998 the estimate of 0.09 implies that the 
proportion of the actual log wage difference that can be explained by factors in the model 
increased to 47 percent. 
As noted above, it is possible that some of the factors in the model may themselves be 
affected by discrimination, which makes interpreting the decompositions in terms of 
discrimination somewhat difficult. For example, the decomposition for 1998 indicates that 47 
percent of the log wage gap of 0.19 is explained by the model, which is sometimes interpreted as 
meaning that this portion of the gap is not resulting from discrimination. In addition to measures 
of education and experience, though, the model also includes controls for county fixed effects as   21
well as dummies for firm size and type of industry. If it were the case that the level of 
discrimination varied systematically by county, then some of this variation would be picked up 
in the county fixed effect. 
With this caveat in mind, it is useful to examine the estimates in the columns labeled 'Education' 
and 'Experience' that measure what portion of the log wage gap is explained by the male-female 
differences in these particular human capital characteristics. The decomposition for 1986 
indicates that about ten percent (or 0.03 points) of the log wage gap of 0.31 is explained by 
differences in educational outcomes. Only three percent (or 0.01 points) of the male-female log 
wage gap is due to differences in average levels of experience. Together, the education and 
experience variables explain 0.04 points, while the model in total explains 0.09 points. This is in 
stark contrast to 1998, when the differences in education and experience explain –0.01 points of 
the log wage gap. In other words, if men and women were paid according to the same wage 
structure, the market would value more highly the experience and education stock held by 
women.  
The penultimate column in Tables 4 lists how much of the difference in male-female log 
wages can not be explained by the model, and the last column lists the standard error of this 
measure. While Oaxaca and Ransom (1998) derive approximate standard errors (based on the 
delta method) for the components of the Oaxaca decomposition, we are not aware of any applied 
research that provides estimated standard errors. The reported standard errors are design matrix 
bootstrap estimates based on 200 replications. The advantage of resampling the design matrix (or 
resampling cases) rather than resampling simulated residuals, is that this method is more robust 
to heteroscedasticity.
35  
The estimate of the male-female difference in log wages that can not be explained by the 
model is typically described as resulting from discrimination, and is the difference between the 
actual log wage gap and that part of the gap which is explained by the model. As such it is 
subject to the same caveats as described above. Nonetheless, it is revealing to examine how this 
measure has changed over time. In 1986 the unexplained component of the log wage differential 
                                                 
35 The disadvantage of resampling the design matrix rather than residuals is that there is a loss of 
efficiency if the constant-variance assumption is correct. Given the large sample sizes of our data sets, the 
potential efficiency loss is not a concern, and our preference is to obtain estimates that are robust to 
heteroscedasticity. For a discussion of the various bootstrap methodologies for linear regression, see   22
was 0.21, or 68 percent of the difference. By 1998 the unexplained component dropped by more 
than half to 0.10, or 53 percent of the log wage difference. Another way to consider this is to 
note that from 1986 to 1998 the male-female difference in log wages declined by an amount of 
0.12. This decline is almost fully matched by the drop in that part of the unexplained portion of 
the log wage differential. In other words, almost all of the decline in the log wage differential is 
due to the drop in the 'discrimination' component of the Oaxaca decomposition. 
In addition to examining the Oaxaca decomposition over the full sample it is also of interest 
to carry out this analysis by size of firm for two reasons. First, the sample frame for small firms 
changed over the time of the analysis and this potentially biases the results. This bias does not 
exist for medium and large firms since the definition of these firm sizes stayed unchanged 
between 1986 and 1998. Second, carrying out the analysis separately for firms of different sizes 
is also of potential interest because the extent of discrimination may be a function of firm size. 
For example, it might be that larger firms are more rigid in how they evaluate and reward their 
employees, following more written guidelines, and therefore are less likely to discriminate based 
on sex. Another, contradicting story, might be that small firms are more likely the newer, more 
market-oriented firms, which act to reduce sex discrimination to improve their profitability. 
Examining the results from Table 5 across Panels A, B and C reveals that in 1986 the male-
female difference in log wages was greatest in the largest firms. Small and medium-size firms 
had approximately the same difference in log wages. By 1998 the picture is strikingly different. 
Large firms now have the smallest gap between men and women in terms of log wages with a 
difference of 0.06. The largest male-female difference in log wages in 1998 is found in the 







                                                                                                                                                               
chapter 6 of Davison and Hinkley (1997) or chapter 7 of Shao and Tu (1995). For a general discussion of   23
Table 5: Oaxaca Decomposition of Gender Wage Gap 
Comparisons by Firm Size, 1986-1998 
 




Part of Gap Explained by the Model




Error           
Panel A: Small Firms          
1986  0.31 (0.0011) 0.09  0.03  0.01  0.21 (0.0009) 
1989  0.29 (0.0015) 0.07  0.00  0.00  0.22 (0.0014) 
1992  0.21  (0.0033)  0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.18  (0.0029) 
1995  0.27 (0.0036) 0.14  0.02  0.01  0.13 (0.0032) 
1998  0.27 (0.0040) 0.15  0.02  0.01  0.11 (0.0035) 
          
Panel B: Mid-size Firms        
1986  0.30 (0.0022) 0.09  0.05  0.01  0.21 (0.0018) 
1989  0.32 (0.0021) 0.11  0.04  0.01  0.21 (0.0018) 
1992  0.17  (0.0051)  0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.17  (0.0040) 
1995  0.19 (0.0043) 0.07  0.03  0.01  0.12 (0.0042) 
1998  0.19 (0.0044) 0.06  0.01  0.01  0.13 (0.0044) 
          
Panel C: Large Firms         
1986 0.39  (0.0092)    0.21  0.18  0.04  0.18  (0.0074) 
1989 0.33  (0.0038)    0.14  0.10  0.02  0.19  (0.0029) 
1992 0.21  (0.0123)    0.04  0.01  0.00  0.17  (0.0098) 
1995 0.15  (0.0045)    0.04  0.02  0.01  0.10  (0.0039) 
1998 0.06  (0.0052)  -0.04  -0.04  0.00  0.09  (0.0049) 
          
Notes: Standard errors are bootstrap estimates from 200 replications. Estimates corrected for sample 
selection bias. The last column lists standard errors for the unexplained component of the model, or 
discrimination. Small firms are less than 50 employees, mid-size firms are between 50 and 300 employees 
and large firms are more than 300 employees. 
 
Another finding is that while the actual male-female difference in log wages diverged 
dramatically for the different firm sizes, that portion of the wage differential which can not be 
explained by the model has followed a similar pattern across firms over time. In 1986 the log 
wage differential which could not be explained by the model was 0.18 for large firms and 0.21 
for small and medium-size firms. By 1998, the 'discrimination' component of the Oaxaca 
decomposition fell significantly for all firms and ranges from 0.09 for the largest firms to 0.13 
for the medium-size firms. From strictly examining the log wage gap, one would incorrectly 
infer that sex discrimination is much less of a problem in larger firms than in small firms. From 
the Oaxaca decomposition, one would infer that the magnitude of discrimination has declined 
dramatically over time, but the variation by firm size is not that large.  
                                                                                                                                                               
the bootstrap, see Efron and Tibshirani (1993).   24
Another interesting finding refers to firms with 300 or more employees: in 1998, the male-
female difference in log wages is low at 0.06, but the amount that is unexplained by the model is 
greater than this at 0.09. This means that if the men and women who worked in large firms were 
paid according to the same wage structure, and according to the model characteristics, then those 
women would earn more than men.  
Table 6 provides the results from separate Oaxaca decompositions for public and private 
firms.
36 One candidate hypothesis is that the market punishes discrimination in private 
enterprises through loss of profit, but no such similar force exists in public firms. The results in 
Table 6 do not provide support for this hypothesis. In 1992, the male-female difference in log 
wages was 0.19 in private firms and about 68 percent greater in public firms. Between 1992 and 
1998, the log wage differential declined significantly in both public and private firms and the gap 
between the two firm types narrowed. The 'discrimination' component of the log wage gap also 
suggests that the relative improvement of women's position in the labour market occurred in both 
public and private firms. In 1992 this 'discrimination' component of the Oaxaca decomposition 
was 0.18 in both firm types and declined for both over the next six years.  
The results in Table 6 suggest that there were forces working in both private and public firms 
to reduce discrimination, a finding that is not necessarily inconsistent with Becker's theory of 
discrimination. Becker (1957, pp. 81-83) suggests that democratic forces could work in ways 
similar to market forces to punish discriminatory behaviour. Transition has not only allowed 
markets to function more freely, but has also brought new social freedoms that can change the 
behaviour of public institutions. Similarly, the desire to join the European Union may be 
motivating the government to make sure that remuneration practices of the whole public sector 
are as non-discriminatory as possible.
37  
 
                                                 
36 Public firms include state-owned enterprises, public services as well as public administration. Many 
firms are not clearly classified as public or private by the National Employment Office and are excluded 
from the analysis (for instance, the data includes wage earners in charities and non-governmental 
organisations.) For this reason the results from Table 6 vary somewhat from those reported in Table 5. 
Finally, because central planning was still in force in 1986 and 1989, there are no firms classified as 
private for these years, and this is why this information is only available from 1992 onwards. 
37 As a caveat to these findings, we again note that estimates for small firms may be biased because of the 
changes in the sample (smaller firms are only included after 1995). Since smaller firms may be 
disproportionately privately owned, this change in the sample could be bias the estimates for private 
firms.   25
Table 6: Oaxaca Decomposition of Gender Wage Gap 
by Legal Status of Firms, 1986-1998 
 




Part of Gap Explained by the Model 




Error          
Panel A: Private Firms         
1992 0.19  (0.0034) 0.01  0.01  -0.01  0.18  (0.0029)
1995 0.17  (0.0037) 0.00  0.01  0.0  0.17  (0.0028)
1998 0.14  (0.0046)  -0.01  0.01  0.0  0.15  (0.0037)
         
Panel B: Public Firms         
1992 0.32 (0.0057) 0.14  0.10  0.01  0.18  (0.0038) 
1995 0.21 (0.0029) 0.10  0.08  0.01  0.11  (0.0024) 
1998 0.20 (0.0027) 0.09  0.07  0.01  0.11  (0.0024) 
         
Notes: Standard errors are bootstrap estimates from 200 replications. Estimates corrected for sample 
selection bias. The last column lists standard errors for the unexplained component of the model, or 
discrimination. Indicator variable for private firms not available in WES data prior to 1992. Sample 
restricted to mid-size and large firms. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Using data from the Wage and Earnings Survey (WES) for almost 3 million wage earners in 
Hungary, this paper examines the changes in the relative labour market positions of males and 
females wage earners after market liberalization, that is, before and during the transition from 
plan to market.  
  The available empirical evidence is highly inconclusive and we believe that this is driven in 
large part by data issues. Therefore, for this paper we use data that we believe is superior in 
various dimensions. With these data, separate regressions are estimated for males and females 
following a standard Mincer equation. The wage model controls for county fixed effects as well 
as industry specific effects and corrects for sample selection bias. We then apply the standard 
Oaxaca decomposition to examine how much of the male-female difference in the log wages can 
not be explained by the model. This unexplained portion of the difference is normally interpreted 
as resulting from discriminatory differences in the male and female wage structures. The results 
from the full sample of data indicate that between 1986 and 1998, the male-female difference in 
log wages declined dramatically from 0.31 to 0.19. Quite remarkably, almost this entire decline 
resulted from a commensurate decline in “discrimination,” or more precisely that component of 
the difference in log wages that can not be explained by the model.  
When examining these results by different firm sizes, we find that between 1986 and 1998 
the largest firms had the greatest decline in the log wage difference between men and women.   26
The log wage difference declined by 85 percent in the largest firms, compared to only a 13 
percent decline in the smallest firms. This difference in declines is due to several factors, 
including the fact that the highest log wage difference in 1986 was found in the largest firms and 
also because the women who work in these firms possess education that is valued more highly.  
The results presented in this paper show a large and statistically significant decline in the 
male-female difference in log wages through five points in time covering pre- and post market 
liberalisation periods. The results also show a large and statistically significant decline in the 
amount of the log wage difference that can't be explained by the econometric model, the so-
called discrimination component. The Commission of the European Communities reports that 
Hungary has made significant progress in instituting a legal and institutional framework that is a 
necessary requirement for accession into the European Union. The results in this paper strongly 
suggest that the reform that took place in Hungary extend to actual improvement towards 
equitable wages for men and women. 
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